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ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND JACOBSEN V. KATZER:
WHY OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DESERVES
PROTECTION UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW
DAVID FERRANCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jacobsen v. Katzer1 has been widely praised as a victory for open source
software;2 however, the sweeping statements it contains about protecting open
source are not central to its conclusion. The court’s reasoning and the unusual
open source license involved suggest that its true holding may be considerably
more narrow. Nevertheless, the argument that “[c]opyright holders who engage in
open source licensing have the right to control the modification and distribution”
of their works3 is compelling from an economic perspective. This note argues that
the most efficient way to ensure that authors retain this control is by amending the
copyright law to explicitly protect open source licenses in copyright.
The term “open source software” refers to software created by “peer produc-
tion”; that is, by large-scale collaboration among individuals.4 Open source
software is software for which the source code is freely available, and which may
be used, modified, and redistributed in either the original or modified form.5
The right to use and modify open source software is granted by means of a
license.6 A threshold question in interpreting these licenses is whether their terms
are conditions to a license or covenants to a contract.7 This note argues that the
economic interests of open source authors justify treating many open source li-
censes8 as conditional grants of copyright rights and not as covenants of contracts.
* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2010. The author thanks Professors Marsha
Baum and Erik Gerding and student article editor Jackie McLean for their support and assistance. The author
has released code under the Artistic License and has used open source extensively. This paper was written
using Open Office, an open source product released under the GNU Lesser Public License. A version of this
paper was entered in the Nathan Burkam Memorial Competition.
1. 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2. E.g., Charles Babcock, Open Source Code on Firmer Ground After Jacobsen Ruling, http://www.
informationweek.com/news/software/open_source/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=210004213 (last visited Feb.
23, 2009); Roberta Cairney, Landmark Case Upholds Open Source Licenses, http://radar.oreilly.com/2008/08/
landmark-case-upholds-open-sou.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); Lawrence Lessig, Huge and Important
News: Free Licenses Upheld, http://lessig.org/blog/2008/08/huge_and_important_news_free_l.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2009).
3. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1381.
4. See Yochai Benkler, Coases’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375
(2002). It is important to note that terminology is a contentious issue in the open source world. See, e.g.,
RICHARD STALLMAN, Why “Free Software” Is Better Than “Open Source,” in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCI-
ETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 55, 55–60 (2002) (discussing why different people prefer
different labels within this movement). This note uses the term “open source” in lowercase to generically refer
to peer-produced software. The terms “Open Source” and “Free Software” are capitalized when referring to
the organizations and philosophies that go by those names. See Part II.C, infra, for a summary of these
philosophies.
5. Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy
Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473, 475 (2003).
6. See ANDREW M. ST. LAURENT, OPEN SOURCE & FREE SOFTWARE LICENSING 4–6 (2004). Licenses
are discussed in Part III.B.1, infra.
7. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999).
8. In particular, non-copyleft licenses. See infra Part V.B.3.
549
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While there may be some societal costs associated with protecting open source,9
these costs are easily outweighed by the benefits to users, authors, and the public.
By making quality software available at no cost, open source benefits both users
and authors. In return, open source authors require only minimal protection.10 As
the Federal Circuit observed, however, contract remedies are inadequate because
courts are likely to find no damages and because license enforcement is best
achieved through injunctive relief, which is difficult to obtain under contract law.11
Copyright, on the other hand, avoids the transaction costs associated with con-
tracts and allows easier access to the remedy of injunctive relief.12 Amending the
copyright laws to explicitly protect open source would ensure that protection is
available to open source software regardless of which license is used.
Part II of this note explains the relevant background in software and open
source. Next, Part III looks at the Jacobsen case. Part IV lays out necessary legal
background, concentrating on law and economics, contract, and copyright. Finally,
Part V tackles the question of whether open source deserves protection and, if so,
what sort of protection is appropriate. The note concludes that open source de-
serves protection and that such protection is best achieved under copyright law.
Accordingly, Part V.C suggests a starting point for how the law could be changed
to accomplish this.
II. SOFTWARE AND OPEN SOURCE
This section contains background material useful in understanding Jacobsen.
First, it explains the basics of how software works and how it is protected. This
leads naturally into an explanation of the two major software distribution models
that exist: proprietary and open source. Because the various motivations of open
source authors are particularly important to the analysis, this Part also describes
the two most prominent open source philosophies.
A. How Software Is Written
To understand how software is protected, it is necessary to know how software
is produced.13 Programmers create software by writing text documents in human-
readable languages such as C++ or Java. These documents are called “source
code.” Source code is both functional and expressive: the same problem can be
solved in many different ways, most of which are crude and inelegant but all of
which solve the problem.
For software to be useful, the source code must be transformed from its human-
readable form into something a computer can understand. This transformation is
called “compiling” the code, and the compiled code is called object code (in fact,
object code is what most people mean when they refer to a “program”). This ob-
9. The potential costs of protecting open source are explored in Part V.B.3, infra.
10. In general, open source licenses seek only to prevent others from gaining a monopoly over the
released code. ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 4 (“The fundamental purpose of open source licensing is to deny
anybody the right to exclusively exploit a work.”).
11. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See infra Part V.B.1.a for a discussion
of the inadequacy of expectation damages for enforcing violations of open source licenses.
12. See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
13. See generally Schmidt & Schnitzer, supra note 5, at 475–77. R
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ject code is simply a series of ones and zeroes. When executed by a computer,
however, object code can cause the computer to do something useful. For example,
a clever programmer might be able to write source code that, when compiled and
executed, was capable of writing legal articles about open source.14
Of critical importance, however, is the fact that object code cannot readily be
converted back into source code, and is therefore not useful for creating derivative
works.15 Students who, possessing a copy of an article-writing program, desired a
program that would write articles about bankruptcy law, would have no choice but
to write their own source code, starting from scratch. However, if the source code
to the article-writing program were available, future students could modify it to
create all manner of legal analysis, thereby saving students the trouble of writing
not only the software but their articles as well. Some programmers might simply
give away the source code to such a program, but a law student will seek to maxi-
mize her profits. To do so, she must first decide upon one of the two major
software distribution models: proprietary or open source.
B. Proprietary Software
Software projects can be divided into two categories: open source and proprie-
tary. Most people are familiar with proprietary software. Proprietary software au-
thors treat software like property—they sell it like any other good or service.16
Microsoft Word17 and Photoshop18 are typical proprietary products; users exchange
money for a copy of the software. Proprietary authors release only their object
code, which is protected under copyright law.19 By withholding the source code,
authors can protect it under both copyright and trade secret law.20
The biggest threat to proprietary software developers is copying. Both object
and source code can be copied and distributed at virtually no cost. Without some
form of technological or legal protection, nothing can stop users from obtaining
software without paying. Unfortunately, nothing can be done technologically to
prevent object code piracy.21 If only the object code of the article-writing program
is distributed, the author will have only ethics and the threat of lawsuits to prevent
purchasers of the program from giving copies of it to their friends.
Source code piracy represents a more serious problem for authors of proprie-
tary software. A person who gains possession of source code can create a compet-
14. Currently, however, it is easier to simply write the article.
15. Dr. Jose´ J. Gonza´lez de Alaiza Cardona, Open Source, Free Software, and Contractual Issues, 15
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 157, 164–65 (2007).
16. See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 81, 87 (2002). Benkler refers to this as “direct appropriation.” This term contrasts with
“indirect appropriation,” where an author benefits from the software by some other means, for example by
increased reputation or by selling related services. Indirect appropriation is discussed more extensively in the
analysis. See infra Part V.A.
17. Word is a popular word processing program. A comparable open source product is Open Office
Writer. See OpenOffice.org, http://www.openoffice.org/why_easy.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
18. Photoshop is a popular image editing program. A comparable open source product is Gimp.
19. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983).
20. BRUCE ABRAMSON, DIGITAL PHOENIX 31–32 (2005).
21. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 250–53
(2000) (explaining that software authors cannot prevent copying, but can only hope to make it difficult). How-
ever, as pirates are unlikely to be paying customers, the loss may be minimal. Id. Furthermore, piracy increases
market share, which can lead to future sales. Id.
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ing product without incurring the fixed costs that would otherwise be necessary.
This is a significant advantage. If the source code to the article-writing program
were available, competitors could use it to enter the market without experiencing
the development costs incurred by the original author. The desire to avoid creating
competition is the reason proprietary developers distribute only object code. Be-
cause source code cannot easily be reverse engineered from object code, distribut-
ing object code without its source effectively stops competitors from avoiding
development costs, thereby leveling the playing field.
C. Open Source
An important alternative to the proprietary model is open source. There are
varying definitions for the term open source, but in general, open source software
is software for which the source code is freely available, and which everybody has
the right to use, modify, and to redistribute in either the original or modified
form.22 Rather than directly appropriating benefits from software by charging for
it, open source authors obtain benefits indirectly.23
Discussions of the development of the open source movement inevitably begin
with one of its early pioneers, Richard Stallman. Frustrated by a printer vendor
that refused to allow him access to code he needed to add features he desired,
Stallman felt that he was faced with a “stark moral choice”: he could become a
proprietary developer, or he could create a new way of distributing software.24
Stallman quit his job and began writing free software under what was to become
the most well-known public license for software: the General Public License
(GPL).25 Shortly thereafter, he founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) to
promote what he calls “free software.”26 Today, the FSF advocates for free
software, holds many of the GNU copyrights, and enforces the GPL.27
Free software refers not to price, but to freedom.28 According to Stallman, free-
dom consists of four things:
• Freedom 0: The freedom to run the program, for any purpose.
• Freedom 1: The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it
to your needs. (Access to the source code is a precondition for this.)
• Freedom 2: The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your
neighbor.
• Freedom 3: The freedom to improve the program, and release your im-
provements to the public, so that the whole community benefits.29
22. Schmidt & Schnitzer, supra note 5, at 475. R
23. For example, by offering consulting services related to their software. See infra Part V.A.
24. RICHARD STALLMAN, The GNU Project, in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF
RICHARD M. STALLMAN 15, 17 (2002).
25. Id. at 18–21. There are now three versions of the GPL. Citations to the GPL in this note refer to
version 2.
26. Id. at 21.
27. See What Is Free Software and Why Is It So Important for Society?, http://www.fsf.org/about/what-
is-free-software (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
28. RICHARD STALLMAN, Free Software Definition, in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ES-
SAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 41, 41 (2002).
29. Id.
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The GPL aims primarily to maximize the amount of software having these quali-
ties.30 To accomplish this, it requires that any derivative works be released under
the GPL.31 This feature, known as “copyleft,”32 is perhaps the most unique feature
of the license,33 and the reason why the GPL is often referred to as a “viral” li-
cense.34 That is, GPL code acts like a virus, “infecting” any project into which it is
inserted by requiring the project to be released under the GPL.35 The viral nature
is intentional: the GPL is primarily concerned with propagating a system of ethics
of software, and the copyleft is how it accomplishes this. As a consequence, the
FSF, which enforces the GPL for many GPL copyright holders, is not concerned
with monetary damages, but rather with bringing users into compliance with the
license terms (and thus Stallman’s ethics).36
Not everyone agreed with Stallman’s approach. In 1998, Eric Raymond and
others created the Open Source Initiative37 (OSI). OSI licenses do not seek the
ethical goals of the FSF; in fact, as Stallman notes, the main difference between the
FSF and the OSI is that the OSI deliberately avoids ethical and moral issues.38
OSI’s account of the differences between the two organizations is less charitable,
claiming that the OSI was founded because “it was time to dump the moralizing
and confrontational attitude that had been associated with ‘free software’ in the
past and sell the idea strictly on . . . pragmatic, business-case grounds.”39
Accordingly, instead of freedom, the OSI is concerned with obtaining the prac-
tical benefits of public licensing. It defines Open Source as “a development
method [that seeks] better quality, higher reliability, more flexibility, lower cost,
and an end to predatory vendor lock-in.”40 In other words, these licenses permit
modifications when they are likely to improve the reputation of the software or its
authors. These goals are not unique to Open Source; rather, Open Source could be
thought of as Free Software minus the copyleft clause. This eminently utilitarian
philosophy fits well with existing copyright law.
Jacobsen involved source code released under the Artistic License. This license
is an open source license granting users the rights “to use and distribute the
[software] in a more-or-less customary fashion, plus to make reasonable modifica-
30. See GPL Preamble, available at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.php (last visited May 10,
2010); see also ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 36. R
31. See GPL ¶ 2; see also ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 38–40. R
32. Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open Source and Free
Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 443, 455–56 (2005). The term “copyleft” refers to the portion of
the GPL that requires that any work derived from code licensed under the GPL can only be distributed under
the GPL. An important consequence of this is that GPL code cannot be made proprietary.
33. Id. at 448.
34. See, e.g., Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J.
349, 359–60 (2002) (“[I]f you incorporate some GPL code in your proprietary software product, arguably your
whole proprietary product becomes open source and must be licensed by you under the GPL.”).
35. Id.
36. See Licensee Violations and Compliance, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/compliance (last visited Jan.
13, 2009).
37. For the history of the formation of the OSI, see http://www.opensource.org/history (last visited Jan.
13, 2009).
38. STALLMAN, supra note 4, at 59 (“‘[O]pen source’ was designed not to raise [moral and ethical R
issues].”).
39. History of the OSI, http://opensource.org/history (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
40. Open Source Initiative, http://opensource.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
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tions.”41 Users may also modify the software, provided that they insert notices into
each modified file describing the changes,42 and provided that either the changes
are made freely available or other arrangements are made with the copyright
holder.43 Users are also required to leave all original copyright notices and dis-
claimers untouched.44
The Artistic License is less ambitious than either the GPL or most OSI licenses.
Instead of seeking to promote a philosophy or methodology, the Artistic License
was designed largely to protect the Perl programming language.45 Its objective is to
allow “the Copyright Holder [to] maintain[ ] some semblance of artistic control.”46
To maintain this integrity, the license imposes conditions on those making modifi-
cations: they must indicate how to obtain the original code, and they must include
“prominent notice” of when and how each change was made.47 These restrictions
reduce the likelihood that new projects will be “forked” from Perl, causing confu-
sion or reducing the number of users or developers of the project.48 In some re-
spects, the original Artistic License appears to attempt to use copyright to pursue
goals more appropriately achieved through trademark law, a fact that was noticed
when the Artistic License was updated to version 2.0.49
III. BACKGROUND
A. Background Economics
This note examines open source through the lens of Law and Economics. The
premise behind the Law and Economics movement is that economics provides “a
scientific theory to predict the effects of legal sanctions on behavior.”50 This section
introduces the two main economic phenomena relevant to open source: monopo-
lies and the public goods problem.
41. Artistic License Preamble, available at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/artistic-license-1.0.php
(last visited May 11, 2010).
42. Id. ¶ 3.
43. Id. There are two other options (using a modified version only internally within a company, and
renaming executables) which are not relevant to this note.
44. Id. ¶ 1. The License contains a variety of additional restrictions that are not relevant here. It was
originally written to protect the “Perl” programming language. ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 91. Because of R
this, many of its terms only make sense in the context of the unique features of that language. Terms of the
Artistic License not relevant to DecoderPro are not discussed in this note.
45. ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 91. R
46. Artistic License Preamble. Essentially, Wall wanted to prevent others from making high-level
changes to his project in ways he did not agree with. Additionally, he did not want others making changes or
forks that would damage Perl’s reputation and market share. See ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 173. This note R
uses the term “project integrity” to refer to these goals.
47. Artistic License ¶¶ 3–4.
48. See ST. LAURENT, supra note 6, at 94–95, 173. “Forking” is when an author starts a new project R
based on an existing open source project, creating two competing projects. The appearance of a second, similar
project creates confusion for existing users who must decide which project to use in the future. Additionally,
users may abandon the original project in favor of the new one, and new users or developers may choose the
new project over the original. Since open source authors benefit in proportion to the number of users and
developers they attract, forking is harmful to them.
49. See Perl6’s License Should Be (GPL—Artistic-2.0), http://dev.perl.org/perl6/rfc/346.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 27, 2009) (“[D]ue to the limits of copyright law, no copyright license can be written that truly makes
sure that ‘If it’s called Perl, it is Perl’. [sic] This is addressed best with trademark law.”).
50. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (5th ed. 2008). For more on Law and
Economics, see generally RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS (2005); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUN-
DATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
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Legal economic analysis looks at the impact of a law or regulation on some
economic metric.51 For individuals, this metric is consumer surplus.52 The consumer
surplus realized by an individual in a transaction is the difference between what
that person was willing to pay and what they actually did pay.53 For society at large,
the relevant metric is “social welfare.”54
1. Monopolies
A monopoly is a firm that, unlike a market participant (who is constrained by
supply and demand) can fix its own prices.55 The ability to avoid market pricing
leads to two inefficiencies:56 deadweight loss57 and rent erosion.58
Monopolies are only possible when barriers to entry, typically either legal or
technological, prevent competitors from appearing.59 The major barriers to entry
for software are intellectual property rights60 and network effects.61 Intellectual
property rights allow proprietary firms to charge monopoly prices by barring
others from taking certain competitive actions.62 Network effects, on the other
hand, make it easier for a monopoly to come into existence.63 They exist where the
nature of a product is such that the value of the product increases the more people
use it.64 Phone networks, railroads, and highway systems are examples of tradi-
tional networks.65
Once a monopoly arises, it attempts to maximize its profits.66 It does this by
finding the price where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.67 After the point at
51. SHAVELL, supra note 50, at 595–96. R
52. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the individual metric is utility. Id. However, consumer sur-
plus is the dollar value of utility, see IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at 74–75, and this note will generally consider R
effects on individuals in terms of consumer surplus.
53. IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at 48. R
54. See SHAVELL, supra note 50, at 597. Although there is “a vast multitude of ways” of measuring R
social welfare, this note, like most discussions of social welfare, avoids this complication by generally assuming
that social welfare is roughly correlated with consumer surplus. See id.
55. IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at 153–54. R
56. Inefficiencies are situations where it costs more than it should to produce a given level of output.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 17. R
57. Deadweight loss is a loss to one person not offset by a gain to another. IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at R
70.
58. This refers to a loss of surplus that results from competition to secure property rights. Id. at 164. For
example, if several people perform similar research to obtain a patent, the duplicated work of the people who
do not ultimately receive the patent is a form of rent erosion. See id. at 207.
59. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 33–34. R
60. See Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles Approach
to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 83 (2002) (“IP protection . . . confers a monop-
oly on the holder of the IP rights.”).
61. See id. at 118–19.
62. See id. at 92.
63. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 135–36. R
64. See ABRAMSON, supra note 20, at 13. R
65. Id.
66. See IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at 155. R
67. Id. at 156. Marginal revenue is the amount of additional income generated by producing another
product. Id. Marginal cost is the amount it costs to produce that additional product. COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 50, at 26. For example, it might cost $1 to produce an additional copy of the article-writing program, but R
an additional $5 in profits could be made by producing it. Because the price a consumer is willing to pay
decreases with additional consumption, marginal revenue decreases as well. See IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at 4. R
This is due to the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility, which dictates that consumers attach higher
values to initial units of consumption than to subsequent units. Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NMX\39-3\NMX304.txt unknown Seq: 8  9-JUN-10 14:21
556 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
which these two are equal, marginal revenue is actually less than marginal cost,
and the monopolist begins to lose money.68 However, by setting the price this way,
consumers who would have purchased the good for less are unable to purchase it
at all. The loss of the consumer surplus that would have resulted from these sales is
a deadweight loss.
2. The Public Goods Problem
The threat that cheap, widespread duplication poses to software is well known
to economists: it is the public goods problem. Economists define a public good as
any commodity which has large fixed costs and is both nonrivalrous and nonex-
cludable.69 For example, a fireworks display is a public good: watching the fire-
works does not leave less fireworks for others to watch, and preventing non-paying
individuals from watching may be difficult or impossible. This provides temptation
for people to be “free riders,” i.e., to watch the fireworks without paying. The
difficulty and expense of preventing free riders often results in the under-produc-
tion of public goods.70
B. Background Law
An open source license is either a contract, a license, or both. This section pro-
vides the relevant law necessary to understand the legal consequences of any deci-
sion as to which group the license belongs to.
1. Contract Law
A contract is “[a]n agreement between two or more parties creating obligations
that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”71 A contract becomes en-
forceable when parties to it manifest their assent to an exchange of promises or
actions.72 Contracts are enforced in actions for breach, which generally award ei-
ther damages or specific performance to make the parties whole.73 All of these
areas can pose problems in the open source license context.
a. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are costs incidental to exchanges.74 Exchanges (and therefore
transaction costs) can be broken down into three stages: searching for an exchange
partner, negotiating a deal, and enforcing that deal.75 Transaction costs tend to be
low when goods or services are standardized, or when there are a small number of
68. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 26. In other words, when it costs $1 to produce another R
copy of the article-writing program but doing so would generate less than $1 of income, a monopolist will not
produce the additional copy.
69. See IPPOLITO, supra note 50, at 195. A nonrivalrous good is one whose consumption by one person R
does not leave less for any other person. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 45. A nonexcludable good is a R
good for which it is prohibitively expensive to charge users for consuming. Id.
70. See Abramson, supra note 60, at 92–93. R
71. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (8th ed. 2004).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
73. 24 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th ed. 2002).
74. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 91. R
75. Id. at 91–92.
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parties on good terms with one another.76 Costs increase when the parties are un-
friendly or unknown to each other, when there are many parties, or when the is-
sues are complex.77 Transaction costs are important both because they can reduce
efficiency and because when they are too high, bargaining becomes impractical.78
Search costs are incurred in the formation and policing of contracts. From the
user perspective, search costs are incurred in finding an appropriate open source
product.79 From the author’s standpoint, search costs may be incurred in attempt-
ing to determine if license violations have occurred. This is so because an open
source author is usually not aware of who is using his software.
Negotiation costs are incurred in specifying the conditions and consequences of
the contract. In an ideal world, contracts would be “complete.”80 A complete con-
tract is said to be pareto-efficient, meaning that no change could be made to it that
would make it better to either party.81 Because all relevant outcomes have been
accounted for, the measure of damages for such a contract is immaterial.82 Any
circumstances that might cause a party to choose to breach the contract will be
specified in the contract, along with the appropriate consequences.
Unfortunately, all contracts are incomplete.83 The most obvious reason for this
is that the cost of negotiating all relevant outcomes is unreasonably high.84 Because
of this, courts typically use expectation as a measure of damages to fill in the gaps
for outcomes not explicitly addressed.85 This measure is an efficient means of arriv-
ing at appropriate damage amounts without incurring excessive negotiation costs.
Finally, enforcing the contract incurs transaction costs. First, a court must deter-
mine if a contract was formed.86 Courts must also interpret language (for example
by deciding if a term is a covenant or condition) and fill in gaps.87 If a contract has
been breached, the court must determine what remedies are appropriate.88 Be-
cause contract law is state law,89 any of these issues may be subject to litigation in
multiple states, subject to varying laws, and with varying results.
76. Id. at 94. For example, a half-inch drill bit can easily be purchased at any hardware store, but a
3.141 millimeter drill bit would need to be custom made.
77. Id. These are examples of negotiation costs. It is easier to get two people to agree than ten or one
hundred.
78. See id. at 95–96.
79. See id. at 92.
80. A contract is complete if it specifies outcomes for all relevant situations. See SHAVELL, supra note
50, at 292. R
81. See id. at 293.
82. See id. at 342–43.
83. See id. at 299.
84. See id.
85. See SHAVELL, supra note 50, at 345 (“It has been seen that under the expectation mea- R
sure . . . there will be performance in precisely the contingencies that would have been set out in a mutually
optimal completely specified contract.”).
86. To form a contract, there must be a manifestation of assent to the bargain. RESTATEMENT § 17(1).
The most common ways to achieve this are by offer and acceptance or by acceptance by performance. Id. § 22.
Offer and acceptance is convenient when the two parties negotiate face to face. Id. However, an offer may also
be accepted by performance. Id. § 53. If open source licenses are contracts, they are offers which are accepted
by performance. See infra Part V.B.1.
87. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 217–20; SHAVELL, supra note 50, at 293. R
88. See SHAVELL, supra note 50, at 304–09. R
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
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Transaction costs are the focus of Professor Ronald Coase’s first article, The
Nature of the Firm.90 Coase theorized that transactions take place within firms
when it is less costly than transacting in the marketplace.91 This can happen when
market transactions are costly, for example when participants must discover par-
ties and prices and when they must negotiate and enforce contracts for each trans-
action.92 These are precisely the types of costs incurred by open source authors
trying to enforce their licenses under contract law. This suggests that, at least under
a contract theory, software can be produced more efficiently by firms.
In Coase’s Penguin, Professor Yochai Benkler expanded upon Coase’s market/
firm dichotomy, suggesting that peer production is a third major type of project
organization.93 Peer production enjoys substantial advantages in identification of
resources for solving problems. Benkler divided these advantages into two types:
information gains and allocation gains.94
The term “information gain” refers to the process of deciding how best to use
human capital. Markets do this by turning uncertainties into valuations; firms do
this by contracting in ways designed to reduce uncertainty. Both approaches facili-
tate efficient allocation of resources. Similarly, good peer production projects pro-
vide mechanisms for agents to see available opportunities and to select the task
they are best suited to perform.95 This is potentially more efficient than the market
or firm approaches because it reduces search and negotiation costs. As Benkler
observes, “an organization model that does not require contractual specification of
effort but allows individuals to self-identify for tasks will be better at gathering and
utilizing information about who should be doing what.”96
The second advantage, “allocation gains,” refers to the fact that firms are lim-
ited to using only their own employees and property. Firms incur transaction costs
in finding and acquiring the people and property necessary to be productive.97 Peer
production projects are not limited this way, and can potentially draw on a much
larger pool of innovators and resources. As Raymond notes, “[p]erhaps in the end
the open-source culture will triumph . . . simply because the closed-source world
cannot win an evolutionary arms race with open-source communities that can put
orders of magnitude more skilled time into a problem.”98 By avoiding the transac-
tion costs associated with property and contract that limit firms and markets, peer
production projects can be more efficient.99
90. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
91. Id. at 392.
92. See Stewart J. Schwab, Coase’s Twin Towers: The Relation Between the Nature of the Firm and the
Problem of Social Cost, 18 J. CORP. L. 359, 360–61 (1993).
93. Benkler, supra note 4, at 375–76. R
94. See id. at 406–23.
95. See id. at 413.
96. Id. at 414.
97. See id. at 416.
98. The Social Context of Open-Source Software, http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/
cathedral-bazaar/ar01s11.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
99. See Benkler, supra note 4, at 377. R
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b. Remedies
A prevailing party in an action for breach will typically be able to recover mone-
tary damages or obtain specific performance.100 Damages are the most common
remedy for breach,101 and are awarded as either expectation damages, reliance
damages, or restitution.102 Expectation damages, which are the default measure of
damages, attempt to put the party in the position it would have occupied had the
contract been completed.103 Reliance damages attempt to restore the party to the
position he occupied before the contract.104 Finally, restitution damages recover
from a party amounts that that party obtained unjustly.105
Specific performance is awarded by an order preventing106 or compelling the
fulfillment of a promise.107 However, restrictions against such relief are deeply in-
grained.108 To get a preliminary injunction, for example, a party must establish the
likelihood of success on the merits, the likelihood of irreparable harm absent pre-
liminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that the injunction
is in the public interest.109 Specific performance is more likely to be given in situa-
tions where obtaining the substantial equivalent of performance is difficult.110
In summary, contract law is efficient when the parties are known to each other
and when monetary damages are an acceptable remedy for breach. However, the
requirements of privity, the fact that the law varies on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
basis, and the difficulty of obtaining equitable relief can make contract law inap-
propriate for some types of agreements.
2. Copyright
Copyright is the second way to interpret an open source license. This section
explains the utilitarian origins of American copyright law and how it is related to
the problem of public goods. Enacted law, case law regarding licenses, and reme-
dies for infringement are also discussed.
a. Origins and Theory
The copyright law finds its origin in the Constitution: “The Congress shall have
power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”111 Its purpose, then, is to promote progress; it accom-
100. LORD, supra note 73, § 64:1. However, such actions can only occur between contracting parties; R
persons not party to the contract generally can neither sue nor be sued for its breach. See E. ALLAN FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.1, at 672 (3d ed. 1999).
101. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.1, at 540 (4th ed. 1998).
102. Id. § 14.4, at 545.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 14.9, at 556.
105. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101, § 15.2, at 600. R
106. Orders preventing action are called injunctions. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8th ed. 2004). A
preliminary injunction is “[a] temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an irreparable
injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case.” Id.
107. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101, § 16.1, at 612. R
108. Id. at 613.
109. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
110. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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plishes this by striking a bargain with authors giving them a limited monopoly in
exchange for disclosure and dissemination of their works.112
While this bargain allows authors to derive income from their works, reward to
the owner is secondary to the public interest in progress.113 The economic philoso-
phy behind the clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance the public welfare.114 There is an inherent
tension here, however, because greater protection reduces dissemination.115 Strik-
ing the correct balance between protection and dissemination is a key problem in
copyright law.116
b. Enacted Law
The first Copyright Act was passed by Congress in 1790 and largely resembled
the law from England.117 Since then, Congress has revisited copyright several
times, and the scope of term and protection has steadily increased.118
Copyright law defines the scope of what is protected as “original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”119 Section 102 goes on to list
eight categories of works that are protected, the most important of which for this
note is “literary works.”120 Authors of protected works are granted the exclusive
right to copy, distribute, or prepare derivative works of their copyrighted works.121
The most recent sweeping changes to copyright law came with the 1976 Copy-
right Act.122 Important changes included preemption,123 harmonization,124 and di-
visibility and assignment of rights.125 At about the same time, a National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) was
created to study new technology, including software.126
The 1976 Act introduced language intended to abolish state copyright law. In
particular, state law rights equivalent to any of the exclusive rights of § 106 were
explicitly preempted.127 The section provides three conditions which, if met, render
112. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 260 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
113. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131, 158 (1948)).
114. Id. at 219.
115. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 326 (1989).
116. Id.
117. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 25 (1967).
118. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 6–9 (6th ed.
2002).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
120. Id.
121. See id. § 106(1)–(3).
122. Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976).
123. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301
(2006)).
124. See Cardona, supra note 15, at 186–87. International law is especially relevant to open source li- R
censes, which purport to govern worldwide use of software. Harmonization is therefore an important argu-
ment in favor of copyright protection for such licenses. However, the international law aspects of copyright are
outside the scope of this note.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
126. Act of December 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 301.
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a state law invalid: (1) the right protected by state law must be equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights of § 106; (2) the right must be in a work of authorship fixed in a
tangible medium; and (3) the work must come within the subject matter specified
in §§ 102 and 103.128
On July 31, 1978, CONTU issued its final report, which focused almost entirely
on the scope of copyright protection for computer programs.129 In 1980, Congress
passed a law adding a definition of computer programs to the copyright code: “A
‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”130 This definition
includes source and object code, and has been interpreted as adding software to
works protected by copyright under § 106.131
c. Licenses
To obtain value from the exclusive rights, authors grant licenses. A license is
“permission . . . to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful.”132 How-
ever, because “a licensee infringes the owner’s copyright if its use exceeds the
scope of its license,”133 the possession of a license does not authorize the licensee to
take any and all actions, but only those actions within the scope of the license.134
Although state law determines how the license is construed, a copyright license is
presumed to prohibit any use it does not authorize.135
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.136 involved a licensee trying to avoid
injunction by characterizing part of the license as a covenant. When Sun tried to
enjoin Microsoft from distributing non-compliant implementations of its Java pro-
gramming language, Microsoft countered with the claim that the provisions in
question were contractual covenants.137 The court recognized the importance of
the question, noting that “‘[t]he rules for obtaining a preliminary injunction are
less onerous [when the presumption of irreparable harm exists].’”138 It concluded
that whether a license term is a covenant or condition is a preliminary issue that
must be decided before the presumption of irreparable harm can apply, and re-
manded to the district court to decide that issue.139
In MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.,140 the Ninth Circuit
faced the question of whether license provisions were contractual covenants or
limitations on the scope of a license. At the outset, the court noted that use of the
128. Id.
129. William Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: It’s All in the Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1, 29 (1996).
130. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517 § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2006)).
131. See Patry, supra note 129, at 30–32. R
132. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).
133. See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 1989).
134. See id. at 1088.
135. See id.
136. 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 1117.
138. Id. at 1122 (quoting Video Trip Corp. v. Lightning Video, Inc., 866 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1989)).
139. Id.
140. No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 2757357 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).
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software was controlled by both a contract and a license.141 Looking to the purpose
of the various clauses, the court was able to identify which parts of the license were
limitations on scope.142 Specifically, it found that the language “designed to pre-
serve and protect Blizzard’s proprietary interests in its software . . . , including its
copyright interests”143 was a limitation on scope. Language meant only to “regulate
relatively minor matters” was deemed to operate in contract.144 Having decided
which language limited the scope of the license, the court needed only to deter-
mine whether the alleged infringer acted outside of that scope to decide the case.145
d. Remedies
Anyone who violates the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an in-
fringer.146 Action for infringement may be brought by the owner of the exclusive
right violated.147 The main remedies available under the copyright law are damages
(including statutory damages as well as actual damages and profits)148 and injunc-
tive relief.149 Costs and attorney’s fees are available at the court’s discretion.150
The prevailing view is that the presumption of irreparable harm arises when the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of infringement.151 However, eBay v.
MercExchange152 points out that such rules are suspect. In eBay, the Supreme
Court struck down a Federal Circuit case holding that patent owners are entitled to
injunctive relief upon adjudication of patent validity and infringement.153 A general
rule of this type was not a proper test of when injunctive relief was available.154
Instead, plaintiffs seeking such relief must demonstrate (1) that they have suffered
irreparable injury, (2) that the remedies available at law are inadequate, (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, a remedy at
equity is justified, and (4) that injunction would not be against the public inter-
est.155 Nevertheless, the nature of copyright infringement is such that the four fac-
tors are often met, and injunctions on the basis of infringement would likely
continue even in the absence of the presumption of irreparable harm.
141. Id. at *5.
142. Id. at *5–6.
143. Id. at *5.
144. Id. at *6.
145. Id. at *6–7.
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
147. See id. § 501(b).
148. See id. § 504.
149. See id. § 502.
150. Id. § 505.
151. See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983); Autoskill, Inc. v. Nat’l Educ.
Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1487 (10th Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d
1423 (7th Cir. 1985); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A],
at 14-126 n.21 (2008) (collecting authorities).
152. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
153. Id. at 393–94.
154. Id. at 394.
155. Id. at 391.
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Plaintiff-Appellant Jacobsen is a professor of physics and a model train enthusi-
ast.156 As part of his hobby, Jacobsen managed an open source software group
called the Java Model Railroad Interface (JMRI).157 Jacobsen held copyright158 in
source code for software created by this group known as DecoderPro.159 Decoder-
Pro was made available free of charge on Sourceforge160 under the Artistic
License.161
Defendant-Appellee Katzer is CEO and Chairman of the Board of Kamind As-
sociates, Inc. (KAM), a software company active in the model train market.162
KAM offers a product, Decoder Commander, that competes with JMRI’s
DecoderPro.163 Katzer obtained patents on technology allegedly contained in
DecoderPro and attempted to enforce one of these patents by sending bills to Ja-
cobsen demanding royalties.164 Katzer later disclaimed the patent.165
Early in the litigation, it was discovered that files from DecoderPro had been
incorporated into KAM’s Decoder Commander.166 However, KAM had not com-
plied with the Artistic License: it had omitted author attribution, copyright notices,
copies of the Artistic License, identification of the JMRI website, and descriptions
of changes made to the DecoderPro files.167 It also had changed file names without
documenting the changes.168
Jacobsen registered his copyright in the DecoderPro files after the alleged in-
fringement.169 Upon being informed of the infringement claims, KAM voluntarily
ceased all potentially infringing activities.170
B. Procedural Posture
Jacobsen sued for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity and to request an
injunction based on copyright infringement.171 The district court held that there
was no cause of action for infringement and denied the request for injunctive re-
156. Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW, 2007 WL 2358628, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007).
157. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158. For more about copyright, see Part III.B.2, supra.
159. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1375–76.
160. SourceForge, http://www.sourceforge.net (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). SourceForge is a popular site
for development and distribution of open source projects.
161. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376.
162. Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW, 2007 WL 2358628, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007).
163. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376.
164. Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *1.
165. Declaration of Katzer in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 3 in Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint As Moot, Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C06-1905-JSW (filed Feb. 12, 2008). A dis-
claimer is a renunciation of a patent claim. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (8th ed. 2004).
166. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376; see also JMRI Defense: Evidence KAM Copied from JMRI, http://
jmri.sourceforge.net/k/copycomparison.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (containing a comparison of, among
other things, file versions, spelling errors, and capitalizations that are identical in KAM’s files).
167. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376–77.
168. Id.
169. Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *5.
170. Id.
171. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1377.
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lief.172 Jacobsen appealed the order denying the motion for preliminary injunction
to the Federal Circuit.173
KAM argued that because it had ceased the allegedly infringing actions the case
was moot.174 However, the district court disagreed, as it could not find as a matter
of law that it was absolutely clear that the alleged behavior could not recur.175
C. The Lower Court’s Ruling
The district court denied Jacobsen’s motion for preliminary injunction.176 To ob-
tain an injunction, Jacobsen was required to show both probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury.177 Jacobsen claimed that by remov-
ing the copyright and license information and not tracking changes, KAM had vio-
lated the Artistic License178 and infringed Jacobsen’s copyright.179 Copyright
infringement would create a presumption of irreparable harm, allowing Jacobsen
to obtain an injunction.180
The court found that there was not a likelihood of success on the merits.181 In
particular, it noted that JMRI distributed its code under the Artistic License,
which the court characterized as nonexclusive and intentionally broad:182
Plaintiff’s copyrighted decoder definition files are subject to an open source
software license that permits potential licensees, members of the public
who have access to the files on the internet, to make copies, distribute and
create derivative works from the software, provided the licensees give
proper credit to the JMRI Project original creators.183
Under California law, implicit in a nonexclusive license is the promise not to sue
for copyright infringement.184 The court reasoned that a claim for infringement was
thus precluded, but that, if the license were to be construed as a contract, a claim
for breach might still be available.185
Perhaps realizing it had ignored most of the conditions of the license, the court
continued its copyright analysis. Since the existence of a license does not preclude
infringement, infringement can still occur where the licensee’s use exceeds the
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1375. Federal Circuit jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) (2006) because the
district court case was based in part on patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
174. Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *5.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *7.
177. Id. at *5.
178. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Violations of Copyright and Federal Trademark
Laws, Unfair Competition, and Unjust Enrichment ¶ 41, Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 5, 2009).
179. Id. ¶ 100.
180. Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *5.
181. Id. at *7.
182. Id. at *6–7.
183. Id. at *6.
184. Id.
185. Id. This finding is called into question by the court’s willingness, both here and on remand, to find
that copyright law preempts state law claims. See id. at *2–3; see also Order Granting Motion To Dismiss for
Mootness; Denying in Part and Granting in Part Motion To Dismiss for Failure To State a Claim; Denying
Motion To Strike; and Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7–8, Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905
JSW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009).
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scope of the license.186 Focusing again primarily on what the license allowed (not
what it prohibited), the court correctly observed that the license was quite broad.187
However, once again the court limited its analysis of the conditions of the license
to the attribution requirement, simply stating that “[t]he condition that the user
insert a prominent notice of attribution does not limit the scope of the license.”188
The court ruled that a claim for the breach of such a condition should be brought
under contract law, not copyright law.189 Under this reasoning, Jacobsen had not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and injunction was not available.190
D. The Federal Circuit Opinion
Jacobsen appealed the denial of preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.191 On appeal, the Federal Circuit framed the issue broadly
as “the ability of a copyright holder to dedicate certain work to free public use and
yet enforce an ‘open source’ copyright license to control the future distribution
and modification of that work.”192
The court set up its opinion by providing an overview of public licenses and
their goals. Public licenses “are used by artists, authors, educators, software devel-
opers, and scientists who wish to create collaborative projects and dedicate certain
works to the public.”193 To illustrate the scope of work subject to these licenses, the
court provided several examples. One public license, the Creative Commons li-
cense, applies to more traditional copyrightable material (pictures, literature, etc.)
and is estimated to be used for over 100,000,000 works, including all courses at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.194 Additionally, the Wikimedia Foundation,
through its popular website wikipedia.com, licenses some 9,000,000 articles written
by more than 75,000 authors.195
Open source licenses are public licenses specific to software. The court provided
examples of open source software, including the Firefox196 web browser, the GNU/
Linux operating system,197 and the Apache198 web server.199 The court explained
that authors distribute such valuable software for free in exchange for non-mone-
tary economic benefits.200 In particular, authors gain new contributors201 and can
186. Jacobsen, 2007 WL 2358628 at *7.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1378.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Firefox is used by approximately 20 percent of all web surfers. See Browser Market Share, http://
marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
197. Accurate Linux server usage statistics can be difficult to find. IDC estimates Linux had a 13.6
percent share of revenues for servers in 2008. See IDC Press Release, http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?
containerId=PRUS21703309 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
198. Apache powers approximately one half of all websites in the world. See Netcraft, January 2009 Web
Server Survey, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2009/01/16/january_2009_web_server_survey.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2009).
199. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1378.
200. Id. at 1379.
201. Id. at 1382. Users will sometimes become authors if they feel they have something to contribute.
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achieve faster and less expensive development, increased market share, improve-
ments or suggestions for improvements, and enhanced reputation.202 To secure
these benefits, open source licenses enforce certain terms that ensure that down-
stream users are informed of the identity of the author and the terms of the
license.203
Having laid out a policy basis for protecting open source, the court proceeded to
what it considered the “heart of the argument”: whether the terms of the Artistic
License were conditions of the license or covenants to it.204 If they were conditions,
as Jacobsen contended, they would limit the scope of the license and would be
governed by copyright law.205 However, if the copyright protected no economic
value, it might be unenforceable.206 If, on the other hand, the terms were only
covenants, they would be governed by contract law.207
Examining the language of the license, the Federal Circuit determined that the
terms were conditions.208 The court looked to California contract law to determine
that language such as “provided that” creates a condition, not a covenant.209 Fur-
thermore, it found that these conditions are “vital to enable the copyright holder
to retain the ability to benefit from the work of downstream users.”210 Because
copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude, money damages are
not a sufficient remedy; however, a copyright holder can grant certain rights while
retaining others.211 This, the court noted, is “exactly the purpose of adding condi-
tions to a license grant.”212
Turning its attention to the policy issues at stake, the court presented the eco-
nomic case for protecting open source with copyright law:
Copyright holders who engage in open source licensing have the right to
control the modification and distribution of copyrighted material . . . . The
choice to exact consideration in the form of compliance with the open
source requirements of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than
as a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal recognition. Indeed,
because a calculation of damages is inherently speculative, these types of
license restrictions might well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to
enforce through injunctive relief.213
Finally, the court returned its attention to the case before it. Having concluded
that the Artistic License was enforceable in copyright, the court observed that
202. Id. at 1379.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1380. A covenant is simply a promise made in a contract. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391
(8th ed. 2004). A condition is “an uncertain act or event that triggers or negates a duty to render a promised
performance,” and might apply to either a contract or a license. Id. at 312.
205. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1380.
206. Id. at 1380–81. This is the “moral rights” argument. Because this argument is particular to the
Artistic License and is also outside the scope of the economic analysis, it is not discussed in this note.
207. Id. at 1380.
208. Id. at 1381.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1381–82.
212. Id. at 1382.
213. Id. at 1381–82.
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KAM “appears to have conceded that they did not comply” with the conditions.214
However, as the district court had not made findings of fact regarding the likeli-
hood of success on the merits of the copyright claim, the Federal Circuit remanded
with instructions to determine whether the copyright claim could satisfy the re-
quirements for injunction.215
V. ANALYSIS
According to the Federal Circuit, “[o]pen source licensing has become a widely
used method of creative collaboration that serves to advance the arts and sciences
in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined just a few decades ago.”216
This would undoubtedly be sufficient to justify the protection of open source under
the Constitution; however, the Federal Circuit frames its argument in economic,
not constitutional, terms, observing that the Artistic License contains “significant
economic goal[s] of the copyright holder that the law will enforce”:217
Traditionally, copyright owners sold their copyrighted material in exchange
for money. The lack of money changing hands in open source licensing
should not be presumed to mean that there is no economic consideration,
however. There are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the
creation and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that
range far beyond traditional license royalties.218
This section examines the economic interests at stake, whether those interests jus-
tify the protection of open source, and if so, what protection is warranted.
A. Open Source Increases Social Welfare
From the standpoint of economics, protection is only deserved if open source
increases social welfare.219 This section demonstrates that open source provides
substantial benefits to users and authors.
The most obvious benefit of open source is to the individuals and firms that get
the benefit of the software at no cost.220 Free Software and Open Source licenses
permit users to access software for free and to use that software as they see fit.
Unless open source harms the entire field of software development, this alone jus-
tifies protecting it. Additionally, because source code is available and can be modi-
fied, products can easily be made compatible with one another. This inherent
compatibility makes it difficult for an individual or firm to extract profits from any
network effects that develop.221 Also, because network effects develop fastest
214. Id. at 1382–83.
215. Id. at 1383.
216. Id. at 1378.
217. Id. at 1382.
218. Id. at 1379.
219. See Abramson, supra note 60, at 109. R
220. See, e.g., RICHARD STALLMAN, The GNU Manifesto, in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 31, 34 (2002); Open Source Definition (Annotated), http://www.
opensource.org/docs/definition.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009) (prohibiting licenses from requiring fees and
mandating that source code be available at little or no charge).
221. See Abramson, supra note 60, at 138–39. R
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when goods are available to the greatest number of people, users may benefit most
from them when software is free.
Significant benefits also accrue to authors. Originally, when he started the Free
Software movement, Richard Stallman hoped to build a “new software sharing
community.”222 Stallman quickly realized he could make a living providing consult-
ing services related to his open source products.223 Indeed, consulting, ads, books,
and support are now the most obvious avenues of monetization for authors.224 The
Federal Circuit opinion catalogs numerous additional indirect economic benefits
available to authors. For example, it notes that releasing code as open source
software can enhance a programmer’s reputation.225 In addition, releasing code
often results in bug fixes, ideas, and contributions from a very skilled commu-
nity,226 allowing open source projects to be written and debugged faster and more
cheaply than proprietary software.227 Some of these advantages build network
value.228 Additionally, firms can generate market share by distributing some com-
ponents free of charge.229 Ultimately, the Jacobsen court felt these economic mo-
tives were worthy of protection.
Benefits also accrue to authors of derivative or even competing works. For ex-
ample, authors of competing works will incur fewer total costs when they jointly
work on common code as open source.230 Furthermore, by indicating a set of condi-
tions under which software can be used, open source reduces the cost of using
existing works, thus facilitating innovation.231
Finally, benefits accrue to the public. Many governments are looking to open
source for their needs.232 For example, the government of Peru mandated open
source products to ensure that citizens had free access to public information, that
such information did not become obsolete when proprietary file formats were no
longer supported, and to increase the security of citizens and the government.233
Governments also turn to open source to decrease acquisition and maintenance
costs, and to reduce the chance of being locked in to specific vendors.234 Increased
innovation, discussed below,235 is also viewed as a benefit to the public.
222. STALLMAN, supra note 24, at 18–19. R
223. Id. at 48.
224. See Benkler, supra note 4, at 424–25. R
225. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1379.
226. Id. at 1378–79, 1382.
227. Id. at 1379.
228. See id. (quoting Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1200 (11th Cir. 2001))
(“[A]s the Software improved, more end-users used his Software, thereby increasing . . . the likelihood that
the Software would be improved further.”).
229. Id.
230. Ernan Haruvy et al., Competition with Open Source as a Public Good, 4 J. INDUS. & MGMT. OP-
TIMIZATION 199, 209 (2008).
231. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 332. R
232. See Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of Open Source
Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45 (2006).
233. ABRAMSON, supra note 20, at 197. R
234. Lee, supra note 232, at 70–73. Because source is available to be used or modified, vendors cannot R
use secret or protected formats to prevent competitors from making compatible products.
235. See infra note 258 and accompanying text. R
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Open source increases social welfare by conferring significant benefits to users,
authors, and the public. Because of these benefits, it deserves protection to the
extent necessary to ensure optimal production.
B. Copyright Protection Is Preferable to Contract for Open Source Licenses
As Jacobsen makes clear, the choice between enforcing licenses in contract or in
copyright is a critical one. This section examines the implications of each choice,
looking especially at the remedies available under each theory.
This note restricts itself to the modest idea of protecting open source by means
of enforcing existing licenses under copyright law.236 Because many believe that
current intellectual property protection for software is excessive,237 various authors
have examined radical reform.238 Such reform may be the best answer; however,
transition costs, which may well be huge,239 pose substantial challenges to radical
reform.240 In contrast, protecting open source licenses under copyright is likely to
have minimal transition costs,241 yet, by acting as a counterbalance to the overpro-
tection of proprietary software, retains the potential for a significant social benefit.
1. Enforcement of Open Source Licenses in Contract Is Inadequate
The enforcement of open source licenses as contracts presents a number of diffi-
culties.242 However, even assuming that these difficulties can be overcome, contract
law is still inadequate as a method of achieving the benefits of open source.
a. Expectation Damages Are Useless in the Open Source Context
By fixing damages for nonperformance, contracts allow parties to take actions
in expectation of future performance.243 These actions can raise the value of con-
tracts for both parties.244 Viewed as a contract, the goal of the open source license
is to secure future compliance with the license terms in return for the release of the
source code and the granting of rights to make and distribute changes to the code.
On one side, open source authors rely on the license being enforceable in deciding
to release the code. On the other side, creators of derivative works rely on having a
right to modify the code.
236. Changes to intellectual property regimes come in two forms: conservative and radical. See Abram-
son, supra note 60, at 110–11. Conservative reform consists generally of small changes to existing laws, for R
example changing the length of copyright terms. An example of radical reform would be creation of an en-
tirely new form of legal protection for software separate from copyright law.
237. Id. at 136 (“[T]he combined copyright and trade secret protection . . . provides software develop-
ers with protection that is broader than conventional copyrights, possibly deeper than conventional copyrights,
and of effectively infinite length.”).
238. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J. H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
239. Abramson, supra note 60, at 90, 154. R
240. Id. at 112.
241. Id. (“[T]he closer the new rights are to the existing set, the smaller the necessary transition costs.”).
242. E.g., Cardona, supra note 15, at 192–204 (discussing the difficulties in enforcing the GPL in R
contract).
243. SHAVELL, supra note 54, at 310.
244. Id. at 310. However, it is possible to have too much reliance. See id. at 358 n.26.
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Clearly, open source authors are not bargaining for financial gain. Instead, as
discussed above,245 what they are seeking ranges from integrity of the project, to
indirect appropriation of benefits, all the way to effecting social change. Whether
enforcement of public licenses in contract is sufficient to ensure authors receive
what they bargained for depends upon what remedies are available when a down-
stream author breaches the license.
Because authors are bargaining for indirect benefits, it is difficult to measure
their damages when the license, viewed as a contract, is breached. As the Federal
Circuit noted, “[b]ecause a calculation of damages is inherently speculative, these
types of license restrictions might well be rendered meaningless absent the ability
to enforce through injunctive relief.”246 However, the strong presumption towards
monetary damages in contract actions can make injunctive relief difficult to ob-
tain.247 Even when a party can show probable success on the merits, it must also
show the possibility of irreparable injury; however, this can be difficult for an au-
thor who gives his work away at no charge.
The use of expectation damages thus presents a difficulty to open source au-
thors. Because they do not charge for their work, it is easy for courts to conclude
that their expectation damages should be zero.248 Indeed, the parties in Jacobsen
agreed that “there might be no way to calculate any monetary damages under a
contract theory.”249 Awarding expectation damages would essentially permit down-
stream users to violate open source licenses with impunity, thereby eliminating the
consideration relied upon by authors in choosing to release code as open source.
This would ultimately have the effect of seriously undermining the entire open
source licensing model.
b. Enforcement of Open Source Licenses in Contract Imposes
Excessive Transaction Costs
In addition to the lack of adequate remedies, enforcement in contract adds sub-
stantial transaction costs. First, open source licenses are intended to bind large
numbers of parties. The costs of negotiation increase as the number of parties in-
creases. These parties may be in different jurisdictions, which will have different
laws governing contracts. Additionally, simply identifying the contracting parties
could pose substantial search costs. Second, from the perspective of the user, once
an open source product has been found, the user must examine its license to deter-
mine whether the benefit of using the product exceeds the cost of complying with
the license terms. If the user is willing to comply with the license in return for use
of the product, a bargain has been made and there is sufficient consideration.250
245. See supra Part III.A.2.
246. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
247. See 24 LORD, supra note 73, § 64:1. R
248. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. C 06-01905 JSW, 2007 WL 2358628, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007)
(“Because [the code was made] available for free, there was not an expectation of compensation.”).
249. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1383 n.6.
250. See RESTATEMENT §§ 71–79. The requirement of consideration mandates that each party bargain
for the performance or return promise they receive. Consideration need not be of equivalent value to what is
bargained for. Id. § 79 cmt. a. It can even be a promise, if the action promised would itself be consideration. Id.
§ 75.
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Open source, which is simply peer produced software, enjoys reduced transac-
tion costs due to the information and allocation gains inherent in peer production.
Enforcement of licenses in contract, however, effectively reinstates the transaction
costs that peer production avoids. Because contract law also provides insufficient
or even meaningless remedies, open source authors will be less likely to release
software under this regime, resulting in under-production of open source and a
missed opportunity to increase social welfare.
2. Copyright Provides a More Desirable Means of Protection
The alternative to enforcement under contract law is enforcement in copyright.
The very term “license” suggests copyright, and indeed, most authors have as-
sumed that the various open source licenses would be read under copyright law
and not contract law.251 This section examines the costs and benefits of using copy-
right law to interpret open source licenses.
Software, even proprietary software, is for all intents and purposes a public
good. Because software is easily copied and distributed, it can be used essentially
by everyone, and is perfectly nonrivalrous. Additionally, because of the difficulty
in protecting software,252 authors can generally prevent only honest users from
benefiting from software without paying, making software effectively nonexclud-
able. As CONTU observed, “if the cost of duplicating information is small, then it
is simple for a less than scrupulous person to duplicate it. This means that legal as
well as physical protection for the information is a necessary incentive if such in-
formation is to be created and disseminated.”253 CONTU tried to ameliorate this
public goods problem by protecting software under the copyright laws.
Copyright has had only limited success addressing the public goods problem for
proprietary software. Unfortunately, copyright protection only renders software
excludable to the extent that users respect the copyright. Unscrupulous users can
still pirate the code. Because proprietary software authors only distribute object
code, the incentive to innovate suffers to the extent that users pirate the object
code. Many authors do quite well under these conditions (for example, Microsoft).
If proprietary authors were forced to release their source code, however, pirates
could easily use it to make derivative works, or could make the proprietary
software freely available. The combination of increased license enforcement ex-
penses and likely price erosion would reduce the profit motive and ultimately re-
sult in less innovation.
By eschewing direct appropriation, open source sidesteps these issues. Open
source authors do not attempt to prevent people from using their source code.
Instead, they impose minimal obligations on downstream authors of derivative
works to protect their ability to appropriate value indirectly. This greatly reduces
the costs they must incur to exclude prohibited uses of their software. In fact, such
costs are limited to the occasional costs of litigating cases like Jacobsen.
251. For example, the GPL states that users “are not required to accept this License . . . [h]owever,
nothing else grants [users] permission to modify or distribute the Program or its derivative works.” GPL ¶ 5.
252. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. R
253. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 10 (1978).
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Enforcing open source licenses in copyright also reduces transaction costs. Be-
cause there is no requirement for consideration, parties do not need to seek out
one another and negotiate. Furthermore, because copyright law is federal, and in-
deed enjoys some degree of international harmonization, authors and users alike
avoid the need to determine the meaning of the license in numerous jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the availability of injunction under copyright protects the benefits
sought by open source authors. As discussed above, different licenses attempt to
achieve different goals. However, the licenses are similar in that all seek to facili-
tate indirect appropriation of benefits from projects. The least ambitious is the
Artistic License, which simply seeks to ensure project integrity. Next, Open Source
licenses seek integrity and rapid development. Finally, the GPL seeks all of the
above, but also attempts to proscribe the direct appropriation of benefits from the
software. While money damages under contract law cannot ensure these goals are
achieved, the injunctive relief available under copyright law is well adapted to pro-
viding this sort of protection.
Accordingly, copyright is a natural fit for open source. First, the goals of compli-
ance are best achieved through injunctive relief. Because a copyright holder is enti-
tled to the presumption of irreparable harm, this is easier to obtain under
copyright. Second, the availability of statutory damages can help fund litigation,
which might otherwise be a problem for projects that generate no income. Finally,
copyright law is uniform throughout the states, and even enjoys some degree of
international harmonization.254 Enforcing licenses in copyright thus gives the infor-
mation and allocation gains their greatest scope, increasing surplus for projects
suited to peer production.
3. The Costs of Enforcing Open Source in Copyright Do Not Outweigh the
Benefits
Enforcement of open source licenses in copyright law is not without its disad-
vantages. The lengthy terms of copyright protection and the restrictive conditions
imposed by some licenses deserve to be carefully considered. In addition, by pro-
viding software at no charge, open source may reduce profit incentives for firms,
potentially reducing or changing the type of innovation that occurs. This section
examines these potential problems.
Copyright terms are considered excessively long for software.255 Current copy-
right protection lasts for a minimum of seventy years, or approximately the
amount of time computers have existed. Software becomes obsolete in much less
time. The Supreme Court has recently cleared the way for even longer terms, fur-
ther exacerbating the problem.256 Such an extreme imbalance in the length of pro-
tection would ordinarily be detrimental to the public, which benefits from the
disclosure of intellectual property in return for the limited monopoly of intellectual
property rights. However, this imbalance is mitigated for open source. Because
source is distributed and many licenses allow liberal use of the source code, the
254. Cardona, supra note 15, at 186–87. R
255. Abramson, supra note 60, at 136. R
256. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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effects of lengthy copyright terms are mostly felt by authors who would like to use
open source in their proprietary projects.
Another potential downside to enforcement of open source licenses in copyright
is that it would strengthen the GPL’s copyleft clause. Copyleft has been criticized
for reducing open source adoption rates and increasing transaction costs by creat-
ing legal uncertainties.257 Indeed, disagreement over copyleft was an important rea-
son for the creation of the OSI. Authors who do not want their code to be subject
to GPL often must recreate software that already exists. They must also be careful
to avoid having their project infected by copyleft. However, if all open source li-
censes were copyleft-free, open source authors could borrow from one another
without incurring this cost. The existence of copyleft all but ensures that interesting
or valuable open source projects will be written twice. Like competition for patent
monopolies, this duplication of effort is a deadweight loss. However, to the extent
that authors are currently avoiding the GPL, this cost is already being incurred.
Open source also creates difficulty for proprietary firms that would like to
charge monopoly prices for software. The availability of high quality open source
products makes it difficult for firms to charge profitable prices for proprietary
software, thereby threatening that proprietary software will disappear where open
source is successful. Users who would have preferred to pay for the proprietary
software, perhaps because it better addressed their needs, experience a loss in con-
sumer surplus due to this reduction in alternatives. However, where an open
source product is successful, the increased surplus experienced by users of the free
product may outweigh the inability of some users to purchase a slightly different
commercial product.
Nonetheless, pressure on proprietary firms could result in a reduction in innova-
tion. Innovation is regarded as a social benefit because “most societies value the
gains from [innovation] more than they fear its destructive effects.”258 By creating
intellectual property rights, society allows innovators to profit from their ideas.
Society is willing to fund this profit because it believes the increased innovation is
of greater value.259 At least one author contends that even a reduction in the ability
to extract monopolistic terms reduces innovation.260 Of course, some innovation is
likely to occur even when there is no profit to be had.261
A more likely consequence of the reduced profitability of proprietary software
is that the type of innovation that takes place would be changed. Most open source
is written by sophisticated users, for sophisticated users.262 As a consequence, it has
been most successful when addressing the rather specialized needs of those
users.263 In contrast, proprietary firms maximize profits when they address widely
257. Greg R. Vetter, “Infectious” Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or Promoting Resistance?,
36 RUTGERS L.J. 53, 152 (2004).
258. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 120–21. R
259. Abramson, supra note 60, at 94. R
260. See id. at 147–48. Because the marginal cost of software is zero, all commercial software uses mo-
nopoly pricing to some extent. The question is whether the price (both in terms of monopoly price and in
terms of surplus lost to rent erosion) exceeds what society is willing to pay for the innovation embodied in the
software.
261. See Benkler, supra note 4, at 424–25. R
262. See Schmidt & Schnitzer, supra note 5, at 485–86. R
263. Id.
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felt consumer needs. Thus, proprietary developers have a “strong profit motive to
identify the needs of consumers through market research and to develop software
that satisfies those needs.”264 To the extent that open source is able to make propri-
etary development unattractive, the needs of unsophisticated consumers are un-
likely to be met. This could explain why Linux has succeeded so well on the server
side, but has been unable to make significant inroads with desktop users, who
overwhelmingly choose Microsoft or Apple products.265
Of course, it could simply be the case that some projects are better suited to
peer production than to firms or markets. Benkler has characterized peer produc-
tion as a third method of organizing labor that complements markets and firms,266
suggesting that just as firms come into existence when it is possible for them to use
property more efficiently than a market could use it, peer production emerges
when inexpensive communication between a large set of people creates gains that
exceed the costs of not having a market or firm.267 In this case, success of an open
source project at the expense of proprietary software would not represent a social
cost, but simply the choice of the most efficient organizational model for solving
the problem.
The potential costs of enforcing open source in copyright are not as bad as they
initially seem. Excessive copyright terms, although problematic for proprietary
software, are less formidable when source code is available under public license.
Changes in the amount or quality of innovation appear unlikely as consumers will
continue to be willing to pay for innovation not provided by open source authors.
Even the most serious problem, the duplication of effort by authors who do not
want to be constrained by copyleft, is no worse than the rent erosion problems that
have long been tolerated in the patent system. Because these potential costs are far
outweighed by the benefits of open source, the question becomes not whether to
protect open source licenses, but how.
C. The Best Way to Provide Copyright Protection to Open Source Licenses Is to
Amend the Copyright Statutes
The Jacobsen decision did not fully address the problems facing open source
licenses. Although it is tempting to view Jacobsen as standing for the proposition
that open source licenses are enforceable in copyright, the case is better read as
limited to its facts. The question before the court was directed neither at open
source software nor at the broader movement toward peer production. Instead, the
court was tasked with applying California law to interpret the quirky, relatively
uncommon Artistic License. It is possible that future cases will extend the Jacobsen
holding to other licenses; however, it is also possible that future courts will once
again focus on the damages issue. A more complete solution than Jacobsen is
264. Id. at 485.
265. See, e.g., Greg R. Vetter, Exit and Voice in Free and Open Source Software Licensing: Moderating
the Rein over Software Users, 85 OR. L. REV. 183, 198–99 (2006) (explaining that while Linux has captured a
large market share of internet infrastructure, it has lagged behind on the desktop, where it is not generally
perceived as equivalent to Windows).
266. Benkler, supra note 4, at 412. R
267. Id. Benkler is restating, in a more rigorous way, Eric Raymond’s maxim that “given enough eye-
balls, all bugs are shallow.” The implications of peer production as a third archetype of project organization
are discussed in Part IV.C.2, supra.
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needed. Given the overwhelming benefits of open source, this question should not
be left to chance.
Amending the copyright law to ensure that open source licenses are enforceable
in copyright would provide a foundation that authors could rely upon. Because
open source developers have always presumed that their licenses would be en-
forced under copyright law, such an addition would merely codify existing expecta-
tions. This codification would also ensure that authors can continue to enjoy the
economic benefits recognized by the Federal Circuit in Jacobsen. However, just as
the district court failed to recognize the scope of these benefits, the Federal Cir-
cuit’s holding, necessarily concentrating on the facts before it, also failed to ad-
dress the full scope of the issue. A statutory presumption protecting public licenses
would benefit not only software, but potentially all peer produced intellectual
property subject to the copyright laws. This already includes substantially more
than just software, and promises to increase dramatically in the near future. Such a
presumption would not only be consistent with the Federal Circuit’s desire to pro-
tect the economic rights inherent in indirect appropriation, but would also be a
great leap forward in promoting progress in the sciences and useful arts.
The most natural place to insert such a change is in 17 U.S.C. § 301. This statute
preempts state law for matters of federal copyright. A provision preempting state
law in favor of copyright law for open source licenses would fit naturally there.
Such a provision should be designed to make it clear that open source licenses are
governed by federal copyright law, not state contract principles.
Of course, such a law would need to define which public licenses are covered.
This could be addressed most simply by extending the protection to licenses ap-
proved by the OSI. Protection could be extended to FSF licenses if copyleft is not
considered too objectionable. However, the negative effects of copyleft suggest
that caution should be exercised in protecting it. Alternatively, Congress might
choose to sanction open source licenses on a case-by-case basis, or perhaps even to
develop a national open source license. Discussion need not be limited to software,
but might also include copyrightable content covered by other peer production
licenses. For example, protection could be extended to photographs or other media
licensed under the Creative Commons. This is only a starting point for discussion
of what material might be protected; a full examination of this topic is beyond the
scope of this note.
VI. CONCLUSION
Open source software confers substantial benefits to society. In return for these
benefits, authors, through open source licenses, ask only for the minimal protec-
tion necessary to secure to them the ability to indirectly appropriate value from
their work. Unfortunately, enforcement of these licenses in contract renders them
meaningless.
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Jacobsen contained sweeping language to the
effect that open source licenses are enforceable in copyright. However, given the
underlying facts, this language is not essential to the holding, which seems to rely
instead on California contract law. Only time will tell which rationale courts will
apply as different licenses are litigated in the future.
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Protection should not be limited to the Artistic License or even to open source.
Public licenses allowing authors to indirectly appropriate value provide incentives
for innovation. Promoting such innovation is squarely within Congress’s power.
Statutory changes facilitating such protection represent an easy step that could
benefit everyone.
